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Abstract Since the 1990s, political science has been criticised for its inability to ade-
quately theorise the role and nature of the state in an era of global interdependence. In
particular, the discipline is said to have fallen into a ‘territorial trap’. It is founded on a
territorial conception of space that both reiﬁes and limits debate about the state to whether
it is ‘obsolete’ or ‘obstinate’ in a world where power is increasingly located in transna-
tional functional space between countries. This article responds to this argument, provid-
ing a conception of state spatiality that stresses its contingent and variable nature. It claims
that state actors can author functional transnational space by fusing together domestic and
international objects into distinct ‘linkage governance’ (LG) strategies, although such
behaviour will have unintended consequences and not always be successful. It is hoped
this LG perspective will open up a more fruitful set of research questions concerning the
role of the state in the ﬂuid and dynamic world of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
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Introduction
Since the 1990s, political science (and especially the ﬁeld of international relations)
has come under challenge for its inability to adequately theorise the role and nature of
the state in an era of global and regional interdependence. Underpinned by a
territorial conception of space, the discipline continues to reify the state as an
inviolable feature of a ﬂuid and dynamic world, even though power is increasingly
located in transnational functional spaces outside and in between states. Viewing
space in this way, leads political scientists to fall into a ‘territorial trap’: one that
constrains its debate about the future of the state in a way that is unhelpful. The state
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is either ‘obsolete’ or ‘obstinate’, disappearing or persisting in the face of these external
challenges. For some commentators, this ontology betrays an ‘… extraordinarily
impoverished mind set…’ (Ruggie, 1993, p. 143) towards this subject matter.
This article responds to this critique by providing a conception of state spatiality
that stresses its contingent and variable nature. It asserts that the state can have a
signiﬁcant presence in transnational functional space. Indeed, it claims that state
actors are capable of shaping, even authoring this space by deliberately fusing
together domestic and international objects into distinct ‘linkage governance’ (LG)
strategies. Such statecraft will not always be successful. Employing assumptions
from philosophical or critical realism, the article demonstrates how these novel LG
strategies may spawn ‘emergent properties’ that then go onto interact with other
structures and agents in ways that are unanticipated by and unhelpful for, the original
authors. Hopefully, understanding the reasons why LG strategies are formed, how
they endure and why they fall apart will generate a fruitful set of research questions:
Questions that are intended to move the discussion on from the sterile ‘obstinate
versus obsolete’ debate noted above.
State Spatiality in an Era of Global and Regional Interdependence: The
‘Territorial Trap’
At the beginning of the 1990s, a number of scholars began to complain that political
science lacked the conceptual and theoretical apparatus to make sense of momentous
changes that were taking placed in the world at this time. The end of the Cold War
and the collapse of communism in central and Eastern Europe marked the breakdown
of the bi-polar security system that had dominated geo-political relations since 1945.
A new literature on ‘globalisation’ stressed the de-regulation of ﬁnance capital, the
importance of multinational corporations as actors on the international stage and
the intensiﬁed deployment of information technologies linking the world together.
At the same time, novel forms of collective identity and political consciousness have
emerged and ﬂourished in this global space, weakening the principle of nationality as
a feature of societal and cultural relations. Increasing areas of public policy are now
inﬂuenced by autonomous international organisations, who themselves are lobbied
by ever more assertive transnational interest groups. Although all these developments
appear to pose a fundamental challenge to the sovereign state, many political science
approaches continued to give analytical and ontological primacy to this entity.
In particular, the study of international relations (IR) has been subjected to this line of
criticism (see for example, Ashley, 1988; Caporaso, 1997; Rosenau, 1997; Brenner,
1999; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002; Aalberts, 2004; Beck, 2005).
It is not just that IR, with its accent on the sovereign state is thought to be ill
equipped to cope with these real world events. When this subject area has responded,
it has yielded a set of questions and debates that have not been considered especially
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fruitful. Faced with these global challenges, the state has typically been conceptua-
lised as either ‘obsolete’ or ‘obstinate’ (Walker, 1993, p. 14). Take for example, the
literature on economic globalisation. Much early work proclaimed the end of the
state in the face of transnational trade, production and ﬁnancial relations (see for
example, Ohame, 1996; Strange, 1996, Gray, 1998). Over the years a number of
authors have directly challenged this argument. The state continues to persist in the
face of these external forces, albeit in different ‘varieties’ or institutional forms
(Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Weiss, 1999, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hancke
et al, 2007; Jackson and Deeg, 2008). Although the veracity of these claims seems
uncontroversial, the complaint is they generate a rather limited and static concep-
tion of the state in this context of global and regional interdependence (see also
Phillips, 2005). The state is either all powerful or it is nothing. Political science has
been accused of a lack of ‘imagination’ when it comes to framing future political
possibilities in this ever more ﬂuid, dynamic and changing world.
One reason (it was argued) for this lack of political imagination was political
science, and in particular IR’s, conception of space and spatiality. Space is deﬁned
here as the effect of location upon economic, social and political processes, while
spatiality denotes, ‘… how space is represented as having [these] effects’ (Agnew
and Corbridge, 1995, p. 79). In IR space is viewed primarily as territorial. In other
words, space represents a series of discrete blocs (nation states) in the world,
separated from each other by ﬁxed territorial boundaries. These states (territorial
space) are the sole or at least primary site of power and authority, leading to two
further assumptions. First, the sphere of ‘domestic’ politics needs to be distinguished
from ‘foreign’ policy. The former (where ‘politics’ takes place) is characterised by
order and hierarchy, whereas the latter is marked by anarchical structural properties.
Second, the state is conceived as existing prior to, and being the sole container of
society. Agnew (1994) (in a celebrated phrase) has referred to these assumptions as a
‘territorial trap’. This trap can signiﬁcantly constrain the way that political scientists
think about their subject area (see also Reid-Henry, 2010).
The key problem with the academic work that falls into this territorial trap is that it
reiﬁes the state. In other words, it presents the state as an unchanging and inviolable
feature of the international landscape, when historical research has shown it to be
anything but (Brenner et al, 2003). As many scholars have noted, the modern
sovereign state only came into being from the sixteenth century onwards. In medieval
Europe, conceptions of political community took on a signiﬁcantly different form.
Territorial boundaries were much more ﬂuid, with individuals regularly shifting their
loyalty between different authorities. Local, regional and even transnational net-
works, including feudal obligations and connections to the church, often received a
higher priority than allegiance to the state. When these relations began to crumble in
the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries, they were replaced by the modern territorial
nation state, but there was nothing natural or inevitable about that transformation.
It reﬂected a number of contingent, concrete practices that have been continually
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altered and reproduced as the state has ‘remade’ itself over time (Ruggie, 1993;
Agnew, 1994, pp. 72–76; Sassen, 2008; Bell, 2014).
It is this reiﬁcation of the state that makes it so difﬁcult to account for the ﬂuid and
dynamic cross border processes that were highlighted at the start of this article. If the
state is assumed unproblematically to be a ﬁxed and immutable entity, a nuanced
account of its changing relationship with its international environment is heavily
constrained, even if the author in question accepts that the external world is now
constituted by powerful global economic, political and cultural properties. When
faced with such challenges, one is reduced to conceptualising the state either as
‘obsolete’ or ‘obstinate’. Or as Agnew and Corbridge (1995, p. 78) put it:
… the debate has been overwhelmingly in terms of the presence or absence of
the territorial state, rather than in terms of its signiﬁcance and meaning as an
actor in different historical circumstances (author’s italics).
In other words, we need a conception of state spatiality that stresses its contingency
and changing nature over time, while still yet allowing for the possibility that the
state might contribute to the ﬂuidity and dynamism of world politics in the twenty-
ﬁrst century.
Of course, since the 1990s a body of work has been published that explicitly
challenges this territorial conception of space and, in so doing, aims to provide a
more convincing account of a global world that is increasingly interdependent and
changeable. Instead of emphasising territory, this literature is underpinned by an
ontology that visualises space in functional terms. Geographical entities (including
states) have spatial effects as a result of their interaction with one another, but this
interaction takes place on functional lines. Space can exist outside of and in between
states, and these functional spaces can become sites for the accumulation and
exercise of power (Agnew, 1999). For example, Cohen (1998) has applied these
ideas to the evolving geography of money. Currency domains are no longer conﬁned
by territorial frontiers. They are social spaces that are deﬁned by the range of each
currency’s effective use and authority (which of course may be transnational).
To quote Cohen (1998, p. 21) directly: ‘The dimensions of currency space are more
accurately measured not by the standard coordinates of longitude and latitude, but by
supply and demand: the behaviour and decisions of diverse agents … in the global
marketplace for money’. Cohen adopts the label ‘spaces of ﬂows’ (as opposed to
‘spaces of places’) to denote this functional space (see also Woodward, 2005).
Like the early globalisation literature cited above, this work tends to signiﬁcantly
downgrade the role and importance of the state. This is hardly surprising as it was
developed as a corrective to a range of theoretical approaches underpinned by a
territorial conception of space, which reiﬁes the existence of this entity. If the state
has a presence, it is usually as a minor player in a number of transnational networks,
involving international organisations, sub-national authorities and private groups
(Risse-Kappen, 1995). It is these networks that increasingly confront and manage
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(albeit in a piecemeal and incremental fashion) a number of negative policy
externalities in an emerging ‘globalised (functional) space’1 (see for example,
Rosenau, 2000). It is not suggested by these authors that this globalised space has
replaced the international system: Rather, it interacts, co-operates or even competes
with it. That said, this argument seems to rest on the proposition that states (or state
actors) operate primarily in territorial space, while functional space is dominated
by non-state or private actors. Transnational processes are portrayed in binary
opposition to states (Bach, 2010, pp. 566–567; see also Khagram and Levitt, 2008;
Stone, 2008).
This article aims to provide a corrective to this view. Instead of presenting
transnationalism as being in binary opposition to states, it argues that state actors can
author functional space in an attempt to further their own interests. The next section
reviews three theoretical frameworks that have also conceptualised state and state
spatiality in this manner. While containing much that is helpful, the article argues that
this work is problematical in two senses. First, it is often unclear precisely how it is
that states create transnational functional spaces. Second, this literature needs a more
comprehensive account of change and dynamism that can take place as a result of this
strategic action. The second half of the article builds on these criticisms and provides
an alternative approach for understanding state spatiality in a world of global and
regional interdependence.
Theorising the Co-Constitution of the Domestic and the External: Some
Existing Approaches
While a lot of the literature on the impact of globalisation on the state argues that the
latter is either withering away or resisting these external processes, some authors
have moved beyond this simple dichotomy. For example, Clark (1999) has asserted
that globalisation is not as an external reality that impacts on national decision
making. Instead, international networks of trade, production and ﬁnance are part of
the nation state and its structural make-up. Globalisation does not just alter the
context of state action, but changes the nature of the state itself in ways that persist
over time. Globalisation and the state are co-constituted because states themselves
‘make’ globalisation, as well as being ‘made’ by it. Through a multitude of decisions,
politicians and civil servants can produce these processes as well as being reproduced
by them. To distinguish between the domestic and the external (inside and outside the
state) is not helpful in this context (see also Coates and Hay, 2001; Zurn, 2002;
Cerny, 2010).
What is useful about Clark’s work is that he moves from this general claim to
develop some more speciﬁc propositions concerning how states author the inter-
penetration of the internal and external. Instead of states being constrained by an
international system, they now inhabit a ‘uniﬁed ﬁeld of political action’, which
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brings the domestic and external arenas together and undermines territorial
boundaries. States are viewed as ‘nodal points’ within this ﬁeld, operating at the
intersection between the domestic and international and managing the processes
that cross from one to the other. Put a different way, states are ‘brokers’, attempting
to mediate and accommodate the various competing demands from the global and
local. Clark (1998, 1999, pp. 65–66) suggests that, on occasion, states may join up
these two levels if it is perceived to be in their interests to do so .
For Clark, the relationship between nation states and this uniﬁed ﬁeld of political
action will change, and a historical perspective will be needed to uncover this
dynamic process. At times, states will encourage or acquiesce in the co-constitution
of the internal and external arenas. As a result, connections across this domestic–
international ﬁeld may become thicker and more numerous. On other occasions,
states may attempt to retreat from this ﬁeld and its various linkages, a tendency which
Clark (1997) has referred to as ‘fragmentation’. The key to understanding this
unfolding trajectory is the relative distribution of costs, as borne by those states under
academic investigation. Mutual constitution or ‘nesting’ of the domestic and
international will eventually generate problems or contradictions for member states.
The internal costs to a government of participating in this uniﬁed ﬁeld of action will
become increasingly prohibitive and difﬁcult to shift to the external realm. Political
tensions will heighten and spill over into the domestic arena creating pressure to
weaken or cut relations with the global system (Clark, 1999, pp. 63–65). Clark
emphasises there is nothing automatic or self-regulating about shifts in the relative
density of ties between the domestic and external. They will be contingent processes
heavily inﬂuenced by the calculations and choices of state actors.
Similarly, Hobson (2000, pp. 229–235) has argued for a ‘neo-integrationist’
approach that conceptualises the state as inhabiting a space whereby the domestic and
international realms are increasingly interpenetrated. Referring to this terrain as a
‘vortex’, Hobson has the state situated at the centre, playing-off the internal and
external levels in a way similar to Clark’s ‘broker’ image. For Hobson, the state is a
‘Janus-faced’ actor, which adopts a number of strategies for ensuring its interests are
protected when undertaking this balancing act. It can ‘dip’ into global resource pools
and, in so doing, enhance its ability to push through domestic reforms or ‘buck’
domestic institutions. Conversely, it may appropriate domestic institutions to
confront the constraining logic of the global environment. Finally, it can work to
bring the domestic and international arenas together, presumably strengthening the
constitution of the ‘vortex’ as a result.
Underpinning this neo-integrationist approach is a ‘structurationist’ position,
which takes its inspiration from the work of Anthony Giddens, among others.
Structuration theory has provided an inﬂuential response to the ‘structure-agency’
question, which has received considerable attention in the social sciences (Hay, 2002,
pp. 89–134; McAnulla, 2002), including the subject of IR (see for example, Wendt,
1987; Dessler, 1989; Hollis and Smith, 1991; Wendt, 1991; Carlsnaes, 2012).
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In essence, the conundrum is whether researchers should give precedence to actors or
structures when accounting for social and political phenomena. For Hobson
(following Giddens) the answer is that both are relevant. Agents (that is to say,
nation states) are potentially purposive entities whose actions can reproduce and
transform the (international) society in which they live. Yet, it is also true to say that
(international) society is made up of structures that constrain the interactions between
actors (nation states). What is particularly noteworthy is Giddens’ deﬁnition of
structures as rules and resources. Rules can be codiﬁed or unwritten, material or
ideational. Resources also comprise different forms. They are ‘allocative’, allowing
agents to get things done (for example, land or raw materials) or ‘authoritative’,
helping individuals to command or ‘power’. Most signiﬁcantly for Giddens,
structures (deﬁned as rules and resources) only exist in time and space when they
are implicated in the production and reproduction of social systems. Put a different
way, structures only exert power when they enter into the consciousness of
individuals. Structure is internally related to activity, but has no existence beyond
the situations in which people are acting (Layder, 2006, pp. 155–188).
In developing this deﬁnition, is often noted that Giddens was keen to move beyond
a concept of structure that viewed it as an objective set of relations external to actors.
Agents are not dupes of the social system, or mere ‘bearers’ of its demands or
requirements. They are active and reﬂexive beings with a capacity to make a
difference in the world. In producing and re-enacting the structures that surround
them, they draw upon a range of resources and skills that they have picked up over
time. Hobson’s argument concerning the role of the state in IR shares similar ground.
Hobson wants to reinvigorate IR’s conception of the state as an entity with agential
power that can shape the external environment as well as being constrained by it.
This perspective is self-consciously a corrective to what he terms ‘systemic’
approaches (especially neo-realism), which downplay state agency and largely derive
its motivation and behaviour from the anarchic properties of the international system
as a whole (Hobson, 2000, pp. 7–9).
Both Clark and Hobson’s schemas have made a valuable contribution to under-
standing how the nation state and its international context are not just related to each
other, but are co-constituted. However, questions remain concerning precisely how
the state authors the sort of non-territorial spaces that the ﬁeld of political action or
vortex seem to represent. In both schemes, states clearly have what Hobson refers to
as ‘agential power’. They play a creative and inﬂuential role mediating and merging
the domestic and international spheres together. However, it remains unclear exactly
how they undertake this skilled and strategic action. Part of the problem is that the
state remains conceptualised as a unitary whole. What is lacking from both accounts
is much of a sense of what is going on within states. Which actors in particular are
balancing or synergising connections on the ﬁeld of political action/vortex? Is it just
public ofﬁcials (politicians; civil servants) that are involved in co-constitution or will
they work with societal groups to formulate this process? At one stage, Hobson
State spatiality
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(2000, p. 230) suggests that the state’s tactic of playing-off the domestic against the
external levels can in itself lead to their integration. However, intuitively this
statement does not make sense. If one party (A) is involved in playing-off two other
parties (B and C) against each other, A will want to keep B and C apart so that neither
B nor C realises that A is deploying such a strategy. This notion of brokering seems
as likely to entrench territorial boundaries and the domestic/international divide.
A second question relates to structure, and particularly what happens when objects
from the domestic and international levels are integrated. Do such examples of
co-constitution represent a simple aggregation of structures or something more?
It is tempting to think that such a process would generate a momentum of its own.
The more states are penetrated and merged into their external environment, the
more it seems likely that these transnational relations will gradually alter the
constitution of states. Yet as we have seen from Clark’s discussion, partial reversals
are possible. The integration of domestic and external structures (in a way that may
help constitute a globalised functional space) can confer costs on states, leading to
pressure for extrication from such commitments. But how exactly does this synergy
between domestic and external levels produce such costs? Such a discussion
implies that when co-constitution takes place, new properties are created that may,
in turn, constrain states (agency) in unanticipated ways. These properties may be
independent of, and external to states, frustrating their ability to play a mediating or
brokering role.
These observations reﬂect a broader criticism of structuration theory and its
conception of structure as rules and resources. For many, Giddens’ deﬁnition
has yielded a too voluntaristic account of social and political practice. While few
scholars would deny that rules are resources can have some inﬂuence on outcomes,
their meaning and effect cannot be understood outside of the broader social relations
within which they are embedded. These social relations do not just appear and
disappear as and when they are instantiated by actors. They may very well exist
independently of agency and endure over long periods of time (see for example,
Urry, 1982; Thrift, 1985). For example, the rules of resource allocation introduced in
the immediate post-war period have resulted in certain countries becoming econom-
ically dependent on others, through institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund or World Bank. However, that dependency cannot be accounted for simply by
reference to rules. There is no rule stipulating that the population of a developing
country must be dependent on western ﬁnanciers or multinational companies for their
livelihood. Such dependency is at least partly the consequence of social relations in
the international economy that have cohered and persisted (Wight, 2006, pp. 146–
147). In short, we need a more constraining account of structure (ﬁeld or vortex) than
contained in the work of Hobson or Clark. Or at least, we need to clarify how these
structures might generate costs, as well as producing opportunities/beneﬁts for those
agents working within them.
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One ﬁnal approach worth discussing in this context is contained in the work of
Glassman (1999; see also Gonzalez-Vincente, 2011). Glassman’s argument is a
Marxist one and takes its inspiration from the writings of Cox (1981, 1987). States
author global economic integration in order to promote the accumulation strategy of
an internationalised fraction of the capitalist class. To perform this role, states
become internationalised themselves. They work to assist international traders,
companies and investors from the developed ‘core’ of the global economy to
penetrate and constitute ‘peripheral’ markets (with the help of international
organisations like the International Monetary Fund – as we have just noted). In this,
they will be supported by the global spread of neo-liberal ideals and even, on
occasion, military force. Through this activity, a transnational alliance of government
and business elites will operate across territorial boundaries to secure their own
interests, irrespective of nationality.
One advantage of Glassman’s approach is that he disaggregates the state, so that
we get a better sense of who authors this functional economic space and how they
do it. Glassman argues that internationally oriented fractions of the capitalist class
align themselves with state institutions, which also possess such a global
perspective, to achieve these ends. For example, we might expect to see ﬁnance
capital allied with national treasuries, central banks and perhaps even foreign
ofﬁces within the state. At the same time, Glassman is keen to maintain that his
Marxist explanation is not a functionalist one. The internationalised state does not
‘mechanistically’ promote the interests of the internationalised capitalist class.
Rather (and following Jessop, 1990) the state is an ensemble of institutions that are
not necessarily co-ordinated, let alone capable of providing a coherent policy steer.
Indeed, the state has no power of its own: It only exerts inﬂuence when actors
working through its institutions are able to achieve their objectives. In other words,
the capitalist class must engage with and try to shape state institutions in its own
image, if it is to facilitate its accumulation strategy. It may not be successful, and
even if it is, it may be resisted by other classes or groups.
Despite his assertions, Glassman’s argument does have a functionalist feel to it.
Employing the conception of the state that he does, Glassman is of course right to
argue that internationalised capital can never be certain that its accumulation strategy
will always be promoted. That said, it is difﬁcult to see from his work any
circumstances where an internationalised state would act over a period of time to
promote the interests of the working classes, or indeed, any other economic or
societal group. Writing from a Marxist perspective, Glassman (1999, p. 688) has to
accept that the capitalist class has, ‘… crucial constraining and enabling effects …’
on states, and that ‘… World Bank and IMF-led attempts to restructure states along
neo-liberal lines have been the dominating theme within the Third World’. Despite
the novel terminology of the ‘internationalised state’, the broader prospectus reminds
the reader of the ‘core-periphery model’/‘World Systems’ perspectives, which have
also been criticised for their economic reductionism (Skocpol, 1977).
State spatiality
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In short, there is much of value that this article can take away from Clark, Hobson
and Glassman’s work. Glassman cautions not only against the reiﬁcation of the state
but points to the importance of problematising and differentiating its internal
institutional makeup. At the same time, thinking of the state (or more accurately
government elites working through its structures) as co-constituting domestic and
external relations into transnational functional space opens up a fresh and interesting
line of enquiry when it comes to thinking about state spatiality in a world of
interdependence. That said, when we visualise the state as both authoring and
reproducing transnational spaces, we need a clearer sense of how this strategic action
is carried out, and a more nuanced understanding of the limits of such behaviour.
Paradoxically then, we need a more deﬁnite conceptualisation of state power and a
more constraining account of structure.
Linkage Governance
The rest of the article builds on the theoretical frameworks reviewed above to provide an
alternative conception of state spatiality in a world that is becoming de-territorialised.
It begins from the premise that state actors can author transnational functional space.
However, it argues that they do so by deliberately fusing together formerly sepa-
rate domestic and international institutions into distinct policy instruments that operate
across geographical boundaries. These instruments may be designed to help those state
actors manage functional space (and the transnational networks that operate within it) so
that their interests, beliefs and values are promoted or at least not adversely affected.
However, such an outcome is not given. These transnational policy instruments will
contain novel properties that cannot be reduced to their component parts. Such
properties may combine with other agents/structures at a future point in time in ways
that are not anticipated or welcomed by the original authors. The article adopts the term
‘linkage governance’ (LG) to denote such activity. LG is informed by a range of
theoretical assumptions associated with ‘philosophical’ or ‘critical realism’ and it is
important to declare these intellectual debts before proceeding with this argument.
Philosophical realism2
Like structuration theory, philosophical realism conceptualises agents as having the
potential to shape the structural context in which they are situated. However,
realism’s account of change can help us understand how spatial structures can evolve
in unpredictable ways – how it is that structures can ‘get away’ from those that create
them. Realists deﬁne structure not as rules or resources but as social relations that
constitute the world. Social relations refer to: ‘… sets of internally related objects or
practices’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 92). These internal or ‘necessary’ relations specify a
Buller
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situation where one object or practice would not take the form that it did unless
another was related to it in the way that it was. For example, a tenant is not a tenant
without a landlord. Internal or necessary relations should be distinguished from
external or contingent ones. The latter describes a set of circumstances where one
object/practice can exist without the other, although if they become related, that
combination may have signiﬁcant social effects. For instance, human beings interact
with the environment and that behaviour may damage the eco-structure, but such a
relationship does not have to take place (Wight, 2006, pp. 169–170; Joseph and
Wight, 2010). Unlike, structuration theory, structures are external to agents. All
human agency occurs and acquires meaning only in relation to pre-constituted
structures. Agents can and will engage in strategic action, but this behaviour will be
founded on a knowledge of the structural environment that is only partial and
potentially fallible (Hay, 1995, pp. 200–201).
It is when philosophical realism combines this deﬁnition of structure with the
associated concepts of ‘stratiﬁcation’ and ‘emergent properties’ that we can begin
to appreciate how it might explicate the dynamic and unpredictable nature of state
spatiality in the twenty-ﬁrst century. For realists, the world is contoured or
stratiﬁed. The interaction of various groups rests on a social and political
landscape that is made up of a number of strata or ‘layers’. These layers (which
will contain multiple, interacting structures) are the product of previous strategic
battles between groups, all competing to further their interests within the structural
environment that surround them. At any one time, agents will be in contact with
one or more of these layers, just as the layers will implicate each other. However,
such stratiﬁcation can lay the foundation for change in that contingent combina-
tions of structures (of various ages and different ‘biases’) across layers may
produce novel effects leading to tensions and contradictions and pressure for
reform (Sayer, 1992, pp. 118–121).
Philosophical realism encapsulates this idea of previously unrelated structures
coalescing to yield novel effects through the concept of emergent properties. Such
properties ‘emerge’ from the internal relations that comprise structures but cannot be
explained simply with reference to their origins or component parts. In other words,
emergent properties come into existence through social combination. Once created,
they can generate change in conjunction with other external or contingent relations,
including agents. For example, the power of water cannot be explained by its core
constituents (hydrogen and oxygen) because both, on their own, are highly
ﬂammable. However, their combination yields different properties (water), which
can then be used by ﬁreman (agency) to save lives. Of course, when it comes to
examining a particular event or process, there will be numerous structures, combin-
ing across strata in a pattern that will be complex and difﬁcult to interpret. Because,
as social scientists, we can rarely isolate structures for the purpose of causal
explanation, we always need to be careful not to attribute inﬂuence to the wrong
ones (Archer, 1982, 1995; Sayer, 1992, pp. 118–121).
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In short, philosophical realism comprehends the world as stratiﬁed or layered with
multiple, sometimes contradictory structures. As agents appropriate and combine
structures for the purpose of strategic action, they may set off a chain of events that
they do not fully understand and cannot control. It is these ontological assumptions
that can help us understand the contingent nature of state spatiality in a world where
deterritorialisation poses both challenges and opportunities for governments. States
(or state actors) may produce transnational structures, but these structures may then
generate emergent properties. If these emergent properties then combine with
external or contingent relations, this may lead them to evolve across time and space
in ways that are unanticipated and unwelcome to the elites that conceived those
strategies in the ﬁrst place. In other words, the state is a contingent actor, whose
signiﬁcance and meaning will vary over time.
Linkage governance
Having enumerated a number of philosophical realism’s assumptions concerning
agents, structures and change, we can begin to show how they inform the concept of
LG. LG can formally be deﬁned as the beliefs, policy instruments and supporting
arguments that government elites employ to integrate objects from the domestic and
international arenas into distinct governing strategies with their own ontology.
Beliefs relate to the understandings or interpretations held by decision makers
concerning the dilemmas facing them. If we think about space in territorial terms,
the important question for decision makers facing difﬁculties is at what geographical
‘level’ do they originate and occur (Brenner, 2001; see also Singer, 1961; Buzan,
1995). Problems viewed as having ‘domestic’ causes might well be addressed
primarily via national institutions. Issues perceived to be largely international in
orientation may lead governments to seek help outside the borders within which they
are located (see also Jordan et al, 2010). LG on the other hand, refers to a situation
whereby state actors frame a dilemma as spanning territorial boundaries. For
example, politicians may be faced with a predicament that has its roots in global
structural developments, but impacts adversely (and continually) on the domestic
institutions within which they govern. The process of ‘problem deﬁnition’ may be
informed by a conception of space that is not primarily territorial.
The second component of a LG strategy will be the policy instruments that are
developed to solve/manage the problems that are understood to confound territorial
space. If state actors are faced by difﬁculties that are thought to exist in transnational
(functional) domains, they may feel that the best way to confront these dilemmas is to
enter this space, armed with policy instruments that are also transnational in their
form and content. They will do this by bringing together domestic and international
objects into distinct structures, which will then allow policymakers to operate
continually in a way that spans geographical levels. To be clear, LG does not
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describe instances where a government signs an international agreement, but then
pays lip service or ignores the commitments contained within it. Nor does it signify
occasions where an international organisation makes domestic policy recommenda-
tions that have no discernable impact on the country at which they are directed.
Rather, the mixing together of domestic and international objects into distinct
transnational policy instruments will lead to the creation of novel properties, whose
makeup cannot be reduced to their component parts. The deployment of these
instruments (especially if successful) will reproduce and ‘thicken’ the transnational
(functional) space in which they are located.
The ﬁnal element of a LG strategy is the range of supporting arguments advocating
the desirability of fusing domestic and international institutional properties into
distinct (transnational) policy instruments (although policymakers are, of course,
unlikely to use this precise terminology). Such arguments may be deployed at various
levels and target different audiences. Governing elites may try to win public opinion
around to merits of LG, but only if a narrative is perceived to be attractive, or at least
‘sellable’ to the electorate. Otherwise such strategies will be downplayed, as elites
seek to disguise the extent to which the national polity is integrated into transnational
structures. Supporters of LG will also need to win the battle for political ideas within
government. They may be faced by other decision makers who are sceptical
concerning the beneﬁts of such an approach and motivated to resist it. In other
words, LG will be contingent, contested and vulnerable to reversal at any time.
Deﬁned in this way, LG will not be easy to operationalise for the purposes of
empirical research. If one of the distinguishing features of LG is the employment of
policy instruments with novel emergent properties, such properties will often not be
directly observable. As our discussion of philosophical realism has shown, they may
even lie dormant for periods of time, only to be ‘activated’ (revealed) in conjunction
with other contingent structures and agents. For evidence of their existence, we can
of course analyse the language of those state actors supposedly using transnational
policy instruments, but as already suggested, they are unlikely to comprehend or
publicise their own behaviour in precisely these terms. In public utterances and
private conversations, they may continue to make reference to separate ‘national’ and
‘international’ spheres. While we as academics may be alive to the ‘territorial trap’
and its constraining impact on the political imagination, party leaders, their advisers
and senior ofﬁcials may be unaware of such arguments. The continuing inﬂuence of
territorial conceptions of space should not be underestimated.
While researching LG strategies may not be straightforward, there is no need for
undue pessimism. State actors can and have highlighted the transnational nature of
the problems they face, while at the same time articulating the advantage of solutions
that transcend geographical borders. It is also possible to ﬁnd examples of
government elites ruminating about the failure of a ‘domestic’ policy, while at the
same time openly canvassing the need for an ‘external’ solution as a replacement.
To take a case which relates directly to Cohen’s work noted above we can see
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evidence of such discourse and behaviour in British monetary policy in the 1980s and
1990s. Faced with the failure of the Medium Term Financial Strategy (which
stipulated that UK inﬂation could be controlled by targeting the national money
supply), a number of senior Conservative politicians, supported by industry, the City
and a range of think tanks all publicly championed the European Monetary System
(EMS) as an alternative international framework for monetary policy. Particular
attention was paid to West Germany’s dominance within the system. The West
German economy’s post-war record on inﬂation was second to none in Europe and
the independence of the Bundesbank would guarantee that this remained the case
(Lawson, 1992, pp. 494–495). But these technical points were underpinned by a
broader philosophy concerning the perceived constraints on British autonomy and
the gradual emasculation of national policy instruments. In the words of Heseltine
(1991, p. 72):
Most opponents of full British participation in the EMS sooner or later argue
that it would cause an unacceptable loss of sovereignty. But can governments
be sovereign in today’s ﬁnancial world? Stacked against them in the money
markets, with ﬁngers poised to shift billions at the speed it takes an electrical
impulse to cross the exchange ﬂoor, are the money dealers.
This quote indicates British politicians accepting that power existed in the hands of
private actors in functional space in between states.
What about LG policy instruments, containing distinct transnational properties
allowing state actors to govern in transnational (functional) space? How might we
operationalise such a variable? Most obviously perhaps, such instruments would
involve the incorporation by state actors of international institutions into their own
domestic policy frameworks so that the two become co-constituted. These institu-
tions may be formal and impersonal, involving explicit rules and sanctions that are
public. They may be informal, their administration involving much more judgment
and discretion on the part of those individuals tasked with employing them. Such a
policy instrument may generate an arrangement where state actors within a country
collaborate with other actors across territorial boundaries. Elites from other countries
or international organisations may have an inﬂuence on domestic decision making
that is signiﬁcant, continuous and even contentious. The focus here is on the
implementation, as much as the formulation phase of the policy cycle and, in this
sense, LG should be distinguished from theories of intergovernmental bargaining
which usually focus on the latter.
To return to the case of the EMS, once the majority Conservative Party leadership
accepted the important role that the exchange rate could play in regulating inﬂation,
the Thatcher government moved slowly to incorporate the institutional properties of
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) into its decision-making structures.
In October 1990, sterling took its place in the mechanism’s parity grid, which
contained a set of cross exchange rates for all participating currencies. The level of
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the pound was required to stay within 6 per cent ﬂuctuation bands, although this
requirement was not a legal obligation.3 When the limits of the margin between any
two currencies was reached, the central banks of the respective countries were
obliged to intervene in the forex markets to correct this situation (Grahl, 1997;
Mayes, 2001). In other words, state actors in Britain merged European monetary
institutions into UK policy architecture, creating a transnational policy instrument
that spanned territorial space. It was hoped this transnational governing tool would
promote the Thatcher government’s interests in this transnational functional space:
that is, it would help to protect the pound from damaging currency movements that
had undermined domestic monetary policy in the 1980s. If sterling continued to
ﬂuctuate, it was believed that this strategy would give Conservative party leaders
greater resources to govern beyond geographical boundaries through a process of
cooperation involving senior European politicians, ofﬁcials and central bankers.
Britain’s membership of the ERM is not perhaps the most obvious example to use
when illustrating the potentially fruitful application of the LG concept. One can think
of other, more recent, cases, especially in relation to the Europen Union (EU), which
would appear a promising location for this type of governing activity. Take, for
instance, the implementation of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in the
environment sector. Governed by the ‘cap and trade’ principle, the ETS has set up a
market in emissions allowances designed to help the region meet its Kyoto targets.
Although scholars have questioned its effectiveness, incorporation of the ETS into
the domestic policy regimes of European governments has created transnational
structures allowing for the ﬁrst time, the joint governance across territorial levels of
this wicked problem. While the total quality of allowances allocated to institutions
(the cap) was initially decided by member states, historically ministers had to draw
up National Allocation Plans (NAPs), which were then scrutinised by the Commis-
sion. When Brussels felt that such plans were incompatible with Kyoto commit-
ments, or distorted competition, it had the right to challenge governments and
demand alterations. In 2008, further changes to this governance process were agreed,
which strengthened the Commission’s role in the operation of this policy. From
2013, the ETS cap is to be determined centrally, while procedures have been put in
place to harmonise rules for the allocation of allowances. At the same time, greater
use is being made of auctioning, leading to the abolition of NAPs (Nye and Owens,
2008; Van Asselt, 2010; Moore and Newey, 2013).
Conceiving LG in this manner has implications for the political actor that will be
‘designated’ as the focal point for investigation (Frey, 1985). As already made clear,
LG is designed to re-orientate the way we think about state spatiality in an era of
interdependence. So far, the article has given primacy to state actors (politicians, their
advisers and senior ofﬁcials) working through state institutions within a particular
country. In fact, it is gone further in acknowledging the possibility that these actors
may reconﬁgure that state architecture so that domestic and external institutions
become fused together. While these state actors will form the ‘core’ of any political
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actor designation, as the examples above make clear, national governing elites will
often be unable to operate these LG strategies alone. Because of their transnational
properties (reach) their implementation may often involve working with like-minded
government actors in other countries, ofﬁcials in international organisations, perhaps
even the co-option of transnational interest groups. The day-to-day administration of
LG policy instruments may take place formally in transnational policy committees, or
informally in ad hoc groups. Of course, the precise composition of this actor will be a
matter for empirical research, but following on from Glassman and others, our notion
of state agency will no longer be reiﬁed.
At the same time, these examples highlight how close the conceptual boundaries of
LG are to other related terminology. The literature on Europeanisation is an obvious
case in point. As an outgrowth of European integration studies, what originally
marked out this approach was its focus on the way that the EU impacted on the
domestic structures and processes of member states. In particular, research has
focused on the ‘goodness of ﬁt’ between EU and national institutions and the way
that ‘adaptational pressure’ resulting from any ‘misﬁt’ has been mediated within the
political systems of particular countries (see for example, Cowles et al, 2001; Goetz
and Hix, 2001; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005). More recently, political scientists have
started to argue that Europeanisation is a ‘bottom-up’ as well as a ‘top-down’
process. National governments will try to ‘upload’ their ideas and policies at one time
(t1) so that any initiatives coming back down from Brussels at a future date (t2) will
be more commensurate with their own interests (Borzel, 2002; Borzel and Risse,
2003; Vink and Graziano, 2007; Borzel and Panke, 2013). The parallels with LG are
clear. Is LG just another (unhelpful) name for Europeanisation, with the potential to
cause conceptual confusion?
Despite the obvious similarities, the argument here is that subtle but important
differences exist between the two terms. It is true that Europeanisation studies
disaggregate the state and consider the way that EU institutions are inserted into
domestic politics. Such a focus may logically lead to research on how EU and member
states’ policy architectures become interpenetrated and what the effects might be.
However, much of the writing on Europeanisation remains underpinned by a territorial
conception of space, meaning that such a perspective is rarely adopted. Instead the
main question is how the EU impacts upon the national level and whether such contact
has led to a convergence or divergence of policy between states. As soon as EU
legislation crosses over the ‘border’, it becomes ‘domesticated’: a matter of domestic
incorporation, adjustment or even resistance. In short, the key difference between LG
and Europeanisation is the interpretation of space underpinning the two concepts. The
former’s willingness to consider space in non-territorial terms helps us to think about
politics as not involving the impact of one geographical level upon another, but the
fusion of properties at both levels into distinct and novel transnational entities.
Second, LG is not quite the same as transgovernmentalism, although again, the
two terms clearly share a lot in common (Keohane and Nye, 1974). Both concepts
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relax the unitary state assumption and focus on government actors at the domestic–
international interface. Both approaches give analytical primacy to the interaction of
internationally oriented policymakers from different countries and highlight how
these elites may develop interests and beliefs that are distinct from other actors or
groups in their respective countries. One small difference relates to the role of
politicians. Transgovernmentalism is often portrayed as a technical activity, with the
contribution of party politicians being heavily downgraded (see for example,
Slaughter, 2004; Baker, 2006). LG allows for party leaders to be state actors of note
who can potentially inﬂuence governance beyond the nation state in signiﬁcant
ways.4 A more important difference between the two concepts relates to the
phenomena that they are trying to account for. Transgovernmentalism is a theory of
IR/international political economy, originally developed to counter the dominance
of state-centric interpretations of this subject, especially realism. As stated a number
of time already, LG has been introduced in this article to aid our understanding of
state spatiality in a world of increasing interdependence. The emphasis is on how
state actors within particular countries author and reproduce transnational (func-
tional) space, although it is hypothesised that these politicians and ofﬁcials may often
need help from their counterparts in other countries/international organisations to
help them in this task. Of course, LG may very well have implications for how we
think about IR, but this is not its primary focus.
So far then, the article has tried to clarify how state actors produce transnational
space by introducing the concept of LG. However, LG (underpinned by assumptions
from philosophical realism) can also aid our understanding of the contingent,
dynamic and unpredictable nature of this strategic action. When state actors integrate
previously separate domestic and international objects, such efforts may generate
novel emergent properties which cannot be reduced to their component parts and
might not be fully understood. These emergent properties may go onto interact with
other structures and agents in ways that (taking our lead from Clark) confer ‘costs’ on
their initial authors. These theoretical propositions can help to generate an
interpretation of political change that is genuinely open-ended.
To return to the example above, it was noted above that the Thatcher government’s
decision to integrate the ERM into its institutions for economic management created
a LG strategy through which it was able to enter transnational space (the international
currency markets) and better manage inﬂation. However, in the second half of the
1980s (and before the United Kingdom joined), the structures (internal relations) of
the ERM interacted with a number of contingent events in ways that signiﬁcantly
altered the properties of this mechanism. By 1987, the decline of the US dollar led to
an appreciation of the Deutschmark, which had the effect of dragging up the value of
the French franc and other currencies, in what was an unwelcome tightening of
policy. These developments led to complaints about the ‘asymmetrical’ nature of the
ERM and in particular, the power of the Bundesbank. The collapse of the Soviet
Union and re-uniﬁcation of Germany exacerbated concerns about the power of the
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latter in Europe. This combination of structures generated momentum for Economic
and Monetary Union, of which ERM membership now became a necessary ﬁrst
stage. By the time British politicians got round to appropriating what they thought
was a free-standing policy instrument for controlling inﬂation, the properties of this
mechanism had changed. Being part of a broader political project, it became more
rigid and much less tolerant of the devaluations/revaluations that characterised the
ﬁrst 5 years of operation. We might refer to this rigidity as an emergent property.
When the ERM interacted with a number of contingent relations after 1990, this
rigidity (emergent property) made this LG so inﬂexible that it became unworkable
from the perspective of the Conservative leadership in ofﬁce. In this context, one
might cite the divergence of the United Kingdom and German economies at this time.
Britain was experiencing a recession and was in desperate need of low interest rates
to stimulate production and consumption. Conversely, the German economy was
beginning to overheat as a result of the substantial public investment programme in
the east that accompanied re-uniﬁcation. As it was, the decision by the Bundesbank
in July 1992 to raise its discount rate from 8 to 8.75 per cent caused sterling to slip to
the bottom of the ERM. Calls by British policymakers for a general revaluation of
ERM currencies (including the pound) were rebuked on the grounds that such action
would jeopardise the credibility of EMU. It was of course Helmut Schlesinger’s
(Bundesbank President) call for such a revaluation on 15 September, when sterling
was already under tremendous pressure that set off the chain of events leading to
‘Black Wednesday’ 24 hours later (Connolly, 1995, pp. 144–158; Stephens, 1996;
Lamont, 1999, pp. 246–266). However, it is the structural rigidity of the ERM more
generally that is stressed here. What was supposed to be a subtle method of helping
politicians enforce anti-inﬂationary discipline at the societal level, ended up severely
restricting governing autonomy because the self-same politicians misunderstood the
properties of the LG strategy they adopted.
In an interesting post-script to this story, British policymakers have resisted
creating a new LG strategy in the area of monetary policy. This is despite the fact that
the issue of global currency speculation persists, and that an alternative LG policy
instrument has exists ‘on spec’. Through the establishment of a single currency, EU
members have created an independent European Central Bank and have accepted the
fact that its decisions have become an integral part of their monetary policy regimes.
More recently, in 2011, 25 EU governments (including countries currently outside
the Single Currency), negotiated a Fiscal Compact requiring them to codify into
national law a commitment to pursue balanced budgets. And this trend looks like
being further strengthened after the recent agreement to extend the ECB’s remit into
banking supervision (Alexander, 2014; Moloney, 2014). Continual rejection of these
moves by successive British governments (not to mention Greece’s current plight)
helps to crystallise the observation that there is nothing inevitable about the
occurrence of a LG strategy. The existence of a high level of global interdependence
does not automatically guarantee that actors will seek to merge foreign and domestic
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policy. State actors may (re)adopt a resolutely territorial perspective, attempting to
manage, shut out or simply ignore transnational forces from behind their borders.
Conclusions: LG and the Concept of the State
If we problematise the assumption of territorial space, for so long a central theoretical
proposition of much political science literature, what might be the implications for
our understanding of the state in a world of increasing interdependence? This article
has argued against presenting rapidly emerging transnational functional spaces as
being in binary opposition to states. Many academics would agree and indeed, they
often pay lip service to this sentiment. But having declared the signiﬁcance of
transnational functional space, their analytical focus is understandably drawn to non-
state actors who are hypothesised to play a starring role in this domain. There are
approaches that do still place the state-centre stage, but it has been argued here that
they need to be clearer concerning how this institution interacts with this transna-
tional functional space and what the consequences might be. This article has tried to
engage with these questions. It has argued that state actors can deploy LG strategies
to reproduce and shape transnational relations, so that their own interests are
positively promoted or at least not negatively affected.
What are the consequences of the LG approach for our understanding of the state
as a structure? This article accepts the view of the state put forward by Glassman
(based on Jessop) as a strategic site of institutions and practices, which has no pre-
given unity or form (see also Painter, 2010). However, we have seen that when state
actors (or other groups/classes) work through state institutions and try to cohere them
for the purposes of furthering their own interests, such strategic action may involve
them venturing into transnational functional spaces. LG may be one method or tool
for unifying the state in an era of growing global and regional interdependence.
Indeed, if successful, it may serve to deepen the interpenetration of domestic and
international structural properties and ‘thicken’ transnational functional space. This
argument highlights a more general point: that there may be times where we need to
conceptualise these transnational functional spaces as part of our deﬁnition of the
state. This position makes logical sense in a paper that seeks to downplay territorial
notions of state spatiality.
Transnational functional space may constitute our deﬁnition of the state (and our
understanding of the international system) but it does not replace these entities.
Clearly, not every aspect of a country’s institutions will be integrated into the
international system of which it is a part. There will be parts of the national polity
(not to mention its societal structures) that have little or no interaction with its
external environment. Likewise, there will be many aspects of the global world that
will not touch or directly engage with the country under examination. It follows then,
that there will be plenty of issues and decisions to which the LG perspective will not
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apply. State actors will still preside over ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ policy and territory
will remain an important organising property in the study of politics. Instead, LG is a
modest addition to our theoretical apparatus: a concept that will not necessarily
discover new evidence, but may interpret familiar examples in a different but
hopefully plausible and interesting way. Understanding the reasons why LG
strategies are formed, how they endure and why they fall apart represents a
potentially fruitful set of research questions: questions that are intended to move the
discussion on from the ‘obstinate versus obsolete’ debate about the state that was
noted at the beginning of this article.
Because this transnational functional space has its own structural properties that
are not reducible to states or the global society they inhabit, it follows then that we
should designate it with its own label to distinguish it. We could go with Hobson’s
‘vortex’, but that choice is rejected here. Dictionary deﬁnitions describe vortex as: ‘a
whirling mass or motion of liquid, gas and ﬂame etc., such as the spiralling
movement of water around a whirlpool’. More generally, a vortex is associated with
any way of life or activity regarded as irresistibly engulﬁng (Collins, 1982).
Understood in these terms, once constituted, a transnational vortex would not just
be constraining, but uncontrollable by those actors inhabiting it. Instead of allowing
for the possibility that state actors might successfully attempt to manage the various
transnational relations that made up this space, it seems as likely from this description
that states would get sucked into its heart and disappear. Such a concept is clearly
incompatible with the notion of states having agential power, as stipulated by both
Hobson and Clark (and argued for in this article). Clark’s label ‘ﬁeld of political
action’ is preferable in that it is more open to the proposition that states (as agents)
can shape as well as be shaped by the environment within which they operate. That
said, this article will employ the term ‘transnational terrain’ simply because it is
shorter and snappier.
The discussion above suggests that, ontologically, any transnational terrain
spanning the interface between the domestic and external is likely to be disorganised.
It will contain a range of policy areas, most notably perhaps those associated with the
ﬁeld of political economy. But other non-economic sectors may also be represented,
especially as international organisations aligned with transnational groups increas-
ingly penetrate the internal decision-making institutions within states. Different
transnational spaces in different sectors will have their own logics that may not be
related in any obvious sense. State actors deploying LG strategies may be able to
inﬂuence one part of this terrain, only to ﬁnd developments elsewhere rapidly
evolving in ways that undermine their interests. These observations highlight
the well-known challenges facing actors trying to work through and co-ordinate state
institutions to exercise power in a world of growing interdependence. That said, the
LG perspective may help to shed light on the way we understand these difﬁculties.
However, while this transnational terrain may be disorganised, this is not quite the
same as saying that it will be anarchical. As philosophical realism reminds us,
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transnational structures that comprise this domain at any one moment can represent the
coalescence of past strategies and will be biased towards some ideas and behaviour.
Over time, some actors and institutions (including states) may attain a prominence
within this transnational space: like a central ‘hub’ or ‘node’ that is widely recognised
as signiﬁcant. They will become a common location through which a range of
transnational relations ﬂow, providing some order and structure to power relations in
this realm. When this proves to be the case, these hubs or nodes would be an obvious
target for any LG strategies that national governments were thinking of introducing.
In this sense, state actors are not really ‘brokers’ mediating and managing the
relationship between domestic and international levels. As noted, they will be one
actor among many governing in a distinct transnational functional space, although this
space may provide access to resources which, in turn, helps these self-same actors to
more successfully inﬂuence proceedings both ‘at home and ‘abroad’.
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Notes
1 Ruggie (2004) has used the term ‘global public domain’.
2 Realism as a philosophical tradition (as opposed to a theory of IR) is clearly a broad school. It is not
being claimed here that our understanding of this approach can be reduced to the observations in this
article. Because the issue of how to account for change is being prioritised, the discussion below
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highlights the work of some authors associated with this interpretation, over others. The argument below
relies particularly on the work of Margaret Archer, Andrew Sayer and Colin Wight.
3 The ERM, as part of the European Monetary System, was originally created through an extra-legal
resolution of the European Council, as opposed to an amendment of the Treaty of Rome.
4 Although this is not to say they will always be in control.
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